

## **Bulgarian attempts on avoiding isolation on the eve of the second Balkan War – the rupture of the second Balkan League**

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**Demeter, Gábor**

In the following pages I do not want to describe why Bulgaria chose the way of ‘everything or nothing’, and who is responsible for the forecoming events (I leave it to Bulgarian historians)- I want to focus on what other solutions had arisen, and what territorial consequences could have been brought about.

Our topic gains relevance from three aspects: (1) the behaviour, the tactics of the small states in the past is instructive for the present (1991-1999) and future; such as (2) the overestimated trust in international treaties and jurisdiction compared to crude force was a lesson that the whole world learnt in the next decades, and from historical point of view; (3) the diplomatic battle has serious consequences for the balance of Powers, especially for Austria-Hungary.

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The Bucharest Treaty on 10/08/1913 was crucial not only for Bulgaria – which reckoned the failure of creating Greater Bulgaria as the nadir of its modern history, and thus this peace settlement had a decisive role in the behavior of Bulgaria in World War I –, but it also put an end for the optimistic Russian ideas that counted on a long-term agreement and alliance between Greeks, Bulgars, Serbs and Romanians. The conflict had deep impact on the balance of Powers, resulting a dangerous situation for the Dual Monarchy. After the Balkan Wars Austria-Hungary’s former ally, Romania oriented towards Russia, and though the support of Bulgaria seemed to be secured, its failure in realising its territorial aspirations determined, that Bulgaria can only be used for the annihilation of Serbia, and can be won to the Austrian cause only by promising territories of Serbian Macedonia. Earlier, between 1908-1911, when Bulgaria also tried to gain the benevolence of Austria-Hungary, the perspective was less complicated. Prior to 1913 Bulgaria had territorial aspirations against the Ottoman Empire, which was not backed by Russia or – the Tripolitanian War proved – any of the Powers. After 1913 Bulgaria had territorial demands against a Serbia, that was backed by Russia. Therefore a conflict between Serbia and Bulgaria might enhance the threat of a world war, which was not evident between 1908-1911 in case of a conflict between Bulgaria and Turkey. So the value and usefulness of a Bulgarian alliance in the eye of the politicians of Austria-Hungary, decreased. Thus, the Balkan Wars influenced the alliance systems and the outcome of the events in 1914-1918.

The examination of the diplomatic instruments of small states, beside the experience of tactics and strategies, methods and aims (still relevant due to the events of 1991-1999 on the peninsula), is not a negligible factor as well. The following pages focus on the understanding and interpretation of the situation before the second Balkan War and the political reality of the possible solutions of Bulgarian diplomatists. However, the rupture of the Balkan League had already been analysed, our attempt is mainly based on reports of ambassadors still unpublished and uncited found among the archives of Sofia and Vienna.

After having defeated the Turks, it became clear, that – contrary to the terms of the Serb-Bulgarian agreement in March, 1912 – there was an antagonistic opposition between the allies considering territorial aspects. The Serbs had asked for the modification of the agreement (demanding the right side of the Vardar River) several times (first in November, 1912).<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, the Greek-Bulgarian agreement did not mention territorial distribution at

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<sup>1</sup> The agreement in March promised the greater part of Macedonia to Bulgaria, but as Bulgarian troops were fighting against Turks in Thrace, it was mainly occupied by Serbian soldiers.

all, but the aim of Venizelos became quite clear in his letter written to the archbishop of Pelagony, in which he stated to extend Greece's borders as north as possible.<sup>2</sup> It was evident that Serbia cannot remain so small after a decisive victory – Powers needed a Greater Serbia to counterbalance Austria-Hungary, and after the Dual Monarchy had succeeded in diverting Serbian pretensions from the Adriatic, it was inevitable, that Serbia will search for remedy in Macedonia after this failure. Up to the middle of 1913 no one knew, that is was Austria, that encouraged these aspirations.

On his way home from the London peace conference, Venizelos stopped in Sofia. Here he renounced from whole Southeastern-Macedonia including the cities of Drama, Kavala and Seres, but he insisted on keeping Saloniki for Greece. This offer caused a debate in Bulgarian diplomatic and military circles, but the government refused the deal.<sup>3</sup>

The Serbian Prime Minister, Nikola Pašić had insisted on his statement expressed in St. Petersburg in April, 1913, that he could not let Bulgaria extend its borders towards Albania between Greece and Serbia,<sup>4</sup> and claimed, that Serbia was willing to go into war, if Powers were unable to guarantee the common Greek-Serbian border (which means, that the Bulgarians lose a greater part of Macedonia). This was an open denial of the Serb-Bulgarian agreement of 1912.<sup>5</sup>

However the Bulgarians had asked for Russian arbitration on 25, April, 1913 based on the terms of the agreement in 1912, Sazonov, S. D., Russian minister of Foreign Affairs (and the Serbs too) insisted on inviting the Greeks, which was refused by the Bulgarian government, since the agreement of 1912, in which the parties laid down the principle of compulsory Russian arbitration in case of debates, did not mention a word about Greece. Danev, the president of the Sobranie refused the negotiation with Greeks.<sup>6</sup>

It was mainly Bulgarian interest to settle peace with the Turks as soon as possible, in the beginning of 1913, before Serbian and Greek territorial claims grew further. „*The Serbs and Greeks – analysed the situation Danev – would be pleased, if we turned to the weapons again, because they hope to re-negotiate the agreements between the allies (as the price of their help), and therefore Bulgaria would be forced to accept the Greek point of view (on borders), and the agreement with the Serbs could be modified... One solution is to avoid the war, or in case of the renewal of hostilities, we have to face the fact, that we can only rely on ourselves.*”<sup>7</sup> Danev saw the situation correctly, unfortunately he strictly tied himself to the second solution, which led to the isolation of Bulgaria.

<sup>2</sup> HHSIA PA I. Balkankonflagration. Kt. 493. Liasse XLV/11. 11/02/1913.; and Fremdenblatt, 67th year, Nr. 41.

<sup>3</sup> The Bulgarian government was not unanimous in connection with the border-question. Some thought, that if Greeks were able to occupy Asia Minor, then they would resigne from Macedonia, therefore they forced attack on Chataldja-line, and the contribution of the Greek fleet to this campaign against the Dardanelles, which would have promoted the success of the Bulgarian weapons. See: *Markov, G.: Bălgarija v Balkanskija Săjuz sreshtu Osmanskata Imperija 1912-1913.* Sofija, 1989. Nauka i izkustvo. pp. 39-40. According to the report of Miliukov, the Bulgars would have tended to give Saloniki and its hinterland to Greece, if Bulgaria had gained Florina and Kastoria, but Greece refused to do so. *Bogitschewitsch, M.: Die Auswärtige Politik Serbiens. 1903-1914. I-III.* Berlin, 1928-1931. I. Nr. 264. Balugdzitsch aus Saloniki an Paschitsch, 01/21/1913.

<sup>4</sup> *Skoko, S.: Rukovođenje operacijama Srpske vojske u ratu s Bolgarskom 1913 godine.* Vojnoistorijski glasnik, 33. 1-2. 1982. p. 244.

<sup>5</sup> The first Balkan War did not start when the Serbs had intentions to acquire the towns of Prilep, Kičevo, Kruševo and Ohrida in a confidential telegram on 15, Sept. 1912, the right side of the Vardar River. This was an incorrect step, since they could not know, that Austria-Hungary would oppose the Serbian presence at the Adriatic, and later this was their main reason when asking for compensation in Macedonia.

<sup>6</sup> Some shortsighted even went further. The Verhoven Komitet did not want to sacrifice „Bulgarian” towns like Lerin, Kastoria, Jenidje-Vardar (which were occupied by Greece) for Saloniki.

See: *Gesov, I. E.: Lichna korespondencija, Sofija, M. Drinov, 1994.* Eds.: *Popov, R. – Tankova, V.* Nr. 108. 01/29 (02/11)/1913. p. 248.

<sup>7</sup> ЦДА, ф 568 к. оп.1. а.е. 756. л. 17. Of course, the allies neither wanted Bulgaria to conclude a separate agreement with the Turks, as it was against the agreement of 1912, nor a quick agreement after the renewal of the war.

Bulgaria had several possibilities to avoid the second war, and keep at least some parts of Macedonia. (1) Bulgaria could have come to terms with his allies excluding any interference of Powers. Certainly this would have forced Bulgaria to give compensations for Serbia and Greece, but the Enos-Midia line may have remained stable in Thrace, as well as the left side of the Vardar, and there would not have arisen any reason to compensate Romania.

(2) In the second case – as the compensation of Romania became more and more needful after May, 1913 due to the hostile alliance between Serbia and Greece, and owing to the behavior of Austria-Hungary – Bulgaria might have reached an agreement with Romania and Austria-Hungary, as it was wished by Berchtold, Foreign Minister of the Dual Monarchy. A Romanian-Bulgarian alliance might have counterbalanced a Serbian-Greek agreement even in case of an armed conflict between the former league members. This agreement could have secured the left side of the Vardar and the Enos-Midia line. A Romanian-Bulgarian agreement would have been useful, since there were rumours about Serb-Romanian negotiations. Such an agreement might have encircled the isolated Bulgaria. However, the Serb offer of February 1913 was not directed offensively against Bulgaria, but it was a defensive proposal in order to hinder an aggression against Serbia from Austria-Hungary.<sup>8</sup>

(3) In the third case Bulgaria might have accepted the arbitration of Russia or other Powers. It is important to emphasize, that each version had political reality, and offered a more favourable outcome than the peace agreement in Bucharest did. Our task is to describe how and why the Bulgarian elite decided to choose the worst solution, and what circumstances led to the total isolation of Bulgaria.

During the Bulgarian-Romanian negotiations on compensation for Romania, Bulgaria came to the false conclusion that the compensation is not a bilateral affair, but indeed the case of the Balkan League (as a whole). Earlier, the Romanians promised to pay 10 million francs in return for the town of Silistra, and if it does not enough, Bulgaria may get a compensation from Serbia, the town of Pirot. According to the Romanian interpretation they negotiated not with Bulgaria, but with the Balkan League, and loads on the allies should be shared.<sup>9</sup>

Although the Bulgarians remained silent for a long time in connection with the above mentioned offer, later they did not refuse such a solution, i.e. purchasing the benevolence of Romania by offering Serbian territories. On 24 May, 1913 (6 June, 1913), three weeks before the outbreak of the second war, Salabashev, Bulgarian ambassador at Vienna negotiated with Macchio, a representative of the Dual Monarchy concerning the compensation given for the neutrality of Romania. *„I asked him, how Austria-Hungary would see such an act, if Bulgaria promised Serbian territories to Romania, instead of parts of Bulgaria – certainly in case of a war won by Bulgaria. He (Macchio) answered, that the Dual Monarchy would not oppose such a deal, and Bulgaria should negotiate with Romania on this basis.”*<sup>10</sup>

This telegram has revealed many secret ambitions: Austria-Hungary wanted a weak, dismembered Serbia, as the Bulgarians did so, but did not want to intervene through a direct act against Serbia. Secondly, Bulgaria did not tend to give compensation for Romania prior a conflict. Romania would have gained territories only after the war, therefore she needed to support Bulgaria in her aims in order to get anything. Bulgarians feared of compensation a priori, because they thought Romania – after gaining territories – would not support them. This offer was unacceptable for the Romanians, as they feared of the same – if they support

<sup>8</sup> Sosnosky, Th. von.: Die Balkanpolitik Österreich-Ungarns seit 1866. Bd. 2., Berlin, 1914, p. 352.

<sup>9</sup> ЦДА, ф 568. к. оп. 1. а.е. 796. л. 4. Later Romania promised 100 million francs and soldiers as well.

<sup>10</sup> „Popitah go kak bi poglednala Avstrija ako Bălgarija obeshtae da dade na Romănija chast ne ot bălgarska, a samo ot sărbaska territorija i to, razbira se, samo v sluchaj ako imame vojna s Sărbija i Bălgarija pobedi. Toj otgovori, che Avstro-Ungarija njama nishto protiv podobna spogodba, i Bălgarija mozhe da vlezhe v prigovori s Rumănija vărhu tazi baza.” See: ЦДА, ф 176 к. оп.2. а.е. 1369. л. 219.

Bulgaria, and she wins, Bulgaria will give nothing to Romania.<sup>11</sup> They felt it well – certain Bulgarian circles tried to forget about compensation... Third – Bulgaria was not the artisan of the peace at all.

When - at the end of April, 1913 - the peace negotiations between the allies and the Ottomans had started again, the analysis of the current situation became more and more important – with growing hesitation from Bulgarian side. The coup d'état in Ottoman Turkey was a final blow for Bulgarians hoping for concluding peace quickly. In order to put pressure on her former allies, who delayed concluding a peace settlement – who regrouped their forces into Macedonia, while the Bulgarian armies were at Thrace – Danev declared, that Bulgaria would conclude peace with the Turks separately,<sup>12</sup> which was against the terms of the agreement in 1912. This gave an excellent chance for Serbia to depict Bulgaria as the enemy of the peace. Bulgarian general Savov thought, that Powers did not appreciate Bulgaria's role in modifying the balance between the two alliance systems. „*Therefore it is needful to notify France and Russia, that we decided to go to the end in order to validate our interests.*”<sup>13</sup> Savov overestimated the value of Bulgaria for the „entente cordiale” contra Serbia and Greece, and this fallacy became accepted as policy in Bulgaria. But Savov saw it right, that the Balkan Alliance, as an entity, could not be attached to the Entente, as Sazonov hoped. His second vision was also correct: neither of the 2 alliance systems would reach superiority on the Balkans by 1914.<sup>14</sup>

The Bulgarian ambassador in London, Madzharov has also advised Bulgaria to conclude a separate agreement with the Turks, even if her allies oppose, because in that case they would be forced to do the same, after Bulgarian weapons became relieved at Thrace and regrouped in Macedonia.<sup>15</sup>

The Bulgarian Army Headquarters did not wait further. It had elaborated an offensive plan against Serbia and Greece on 18 (31) May, 1913, on the very day when preliminary peace in London was signed, and on the same day when Greece and Serbia concluded a separate alliance agreement with each other.<sup>16</sup> Bulgarian Prime Minister Geshov feared of an offensive action, since he thought, in that case Romania would ask for compensation. Many were aware of the fact, that if Romania's wishes were refused, the country would immediately turn towards Bulgaria's enemies – but no measures were taken to hinder this. „*These moments are extremely important concerning our relations with Romania. It is up to us whether we exploit their willingness to reach an agreement or push them into the hands of our allies ... who won't ignore such an opportunity, after we did so...*” – wrote Kalinkov, ambassador of Bulgaria in Bucharest, who was informed by Maiorescu: „*Tell us friendly: is Bulgaria willing to give us, what was promised by Danev in London (compensation)? In that case you can ask whatever you want from us.*”<sup>17</sup> This means, that on 29 May, 1913 there was chance to gain the alliance of Romania, while the Greeks accepted the offer for demobilisation, and asked the „entente cordiale”'s arbitration in the Greek-Bulgarian dispute,<sup>18</sup> just before signing the Serb-Greek military convention!

<sup>11</sup> Romanians had other ideas to solve the problems. Mr. Lahovary, Romanian ambassador has envisaged the alliance or confederation of Bulgaria and Romania in Paris, referring to the fact, that in 1886 (when the Bulgarian-Russian relation was quite hostile) they planned the same, which was hindered by Russian objection. It is still questionable, how Russia accepted such an act in 1913, resulting the birth of a state of 12 million, blocking the way to the Straits. This idea was fearful for Serbia as well. *Bogitschewitsch*, I. Nr. 316, Nr. 355. és II. Nr. 832.

<sup>12</sup> ЦДА, ф 176 к. оп.2. а.е. 1369. л. 7. 07/20 / 05 / 1913.

<sup>13</sup> ЦДА, ф 176 к. оп.2. а.е. 1369. л. 8. 14/27. May, 1913. Serbs accused Bulgarians of pro-Austrian sentiments.

<sup>14</sup> ЦДА, ф 176 к. оп.2. а.е. 1369. л. 8. 14/27. May, 1913

<sup>15</sup> ЦДА, ф 176 к. оп.2. а.е. 1369. л. 12. 14/27. May, 1913.

<sup>16</sup> *Istorija na Bălgarite*, 1878-1944 v dokumenti. Tom 2. 1912-1918. Periodăta na vojnite. Sofija, Prosveta, 1996, p. 187. Eds: *Trifonov, S. – Georgiev, V.* In these documents attacks on Serbian territories were drawn up beside attacks against the contested territories of Macedonia.

<sup>17</sup> ЦДА, ф 176 к. оп.2. а.е. 1369. л. 22. 16/29. May, 1913.

<sup>18</sup> ЦДА, ф 176 к. оп.2. а.е. 1369. л. 23. 16/29. May, 1913.

It was not only the ambassador in Bucharest who sent urging telegrams, but his colleague in Vienna too. „Berchtold thinks – wrote Salabashev – that we have to conclude an agreement with Romania quickly, thus securing her support or at least benevolent neutrality in a possible war against Serbia... First Bulgaria and Romania have to settle an agreement on benevolent neutrality, and simultaneously they have to sign an agreement on Romania's compensation, and that in turn Romania will give aid for Bulgaria in case of war. But, in order to reach that aim, Bulgaria has to give friendly unforced territorial concessions to Romania at the seashore around Mangalia ... Berchtold is of the opinion, if Romania turned against Serbia, the latter could not count on Russia's support, since Bulgaria is a Slav state as well.”<sup>19</sup> The latter statement does not stand critics, as Russia followed her own policy in 1912-1913, sometimes supporting Greece or Romania, which were not Slavic states. Virtually, Bulgaria still had the chance to get Romania's alliance – beyond neutrality.<sup>20</sup>

„The Greeks now want Seres and Kavala, although earlier promised these towns to Bulgaria – warned Salabashev at the end of his telegram – Italy and Austria-Hungary promised these towns to Bulgaria, it is the Germans, who refuse this promising the towns to Greece... England has not expressed her opinion in this question, but it is fearful, that she would give the towns to Greece, just to push her towards France and Russia. If Bulgarians sign a separate agreement with Turkey in London, the Serbs will accuse them of violating their earlier agreement.”<sup>21</sup> Although the Bulgarian ambassador hoped for Austrian military aid, Berchtold only promised benevolent neutrality, did not even promise to regroup or mobilise troops, stating that already too many soldiers had been directed to the southern frontiers up to that moment.

But the situation was not so evident. According to R. von Mach, King Ferdinand gave orders to General Savov to attack, because he believed, that after the first shots, Austrian troops crossed the Danube and forced peace upon Serbia.<sup>22</sup> Quite early, on 9 May Berchtold said to Tschirschky, German ambassador at Vienna, that in case of an overwhelming Serbian victory over Bulgaria, the Dual Monarchy would intervene by using military force – though did not plan the annexation of Serbia.<sup>23</sup> Since this was told to Salabashev by the German ambassador, the Bulgarians later did not give up fighting after the first reports on the failure of their military movements had arrived. Based on Austrian documents, Bulgarians verified

<sup>19</sup> ЦДА, ф 176 к. оп.2. а.е. 1369. л. 38. 16./29. 05. 1913. In case of such a Bulgarian-Romanian agreement Romania's interest would be maintaining peace, rather than a war on the side of Bulgaria.

<sup>20</sup> Berchtold probably had right, when he claimed, that in case of a Bulgarian-Romanian alliance and a war against Serbia (without the intervention of Austria-Hungary) Russia might have remained neutral, since Russia wanted to win the benevolence or alliance of Romania and tear it away from the Triplice. But a new Bulgarian-Romanian Balkan League necessarily should have committed itself on either Austria-Hungary's or Russia's side. As the potential prey – Serbia – was not friendly towards Austria, Russia might have supported the small state, just to hinder further Austrian penetration into the peninsula, even if Russia sympathized originally with Bulgaria or Romania, and the Bulgarian-Romanian alliance would have been created under the auspice of Russia. So, an alliance between Romania and Bulgaria concluded under Russian aegis could not be turned against Serbia – and Bulgarians would rather be interested in Macedonia, than in a new, but passive and rusophil alliance. This means, that Romanian and Bulgarian aspirations could only be realized, if they turned to Austria-Hungary. These two countries could have easily overcome the obstacle, called Serbia – even if Austria remains neutral (and Greece and Turkey remains passive in the game). This would strengthen the positions of the Dual Monarchy.

Therefore it was not Russia's interest to vitalize a Romanian-Bulgarian alliance turning against Serbia. Since such an alliance under the aegis of Austria-Hungary could not be stopped by simple diplomatic means, only by Russian weapons – threatening with a worldwide war – Russia had to hinder the creation of such an alliance. Therefore it was not Russia's interest to support the peaceful compensation of Romania, what Russia did earlier, before the Protocol of St. Petersburg had been signed, when Bulgarians were too close to the Straits.

For Berchtold, it was inevitable to hinder a Romanian-Bulgarian alliance under the aegis of Russia, because it would mean a deterioration in the geostrategic position of Austria-Hungary losing at least one potential ally, secondly, it would create a new Balkan Alliance too close to the Straits – and Berchtold has fought for a year to disintegrate its predecessor with same pretentions (an alliance supported by Russia too close to the Straits).

Such an alliance under Russian auspice would not have been acceptable for Austria-Hungary even if Russia had sacrificed Serbia (which seemed to be quite improbable), and thus the Dual Monarchy had got free way to Saloniki (through Greater Bulgaria). These solutions were thought over in Sofia: Berchtold did not fear of Turkish interference in his calculations, his opinion was that Ottoman Turkey remains neutral in case of a Bulgarian-Serbian conflict. The latter was thought to be probable by the Bulgarians themselves as well. ЦДА, ф 176 к. оп.2. а.е. 1369. л. 38. 16./29. May 1913.

<sup>21</sup> ЦДА, ф 176 к. оп.2. а.е. 1369. л. 38. 16./29. 05. 1913.

<sup>22</sup> Mach, R. von.; Aus bewegter Balkanzeit, 1879-1918. Berlin. 1928. p. 235.

<sup>23</sup> Conrad von Hötzendorf: Aus meiner Dienstzeit. 1906-1918. I-III. Wien, 1922. III. p. 353.

that Austria-Hungary did not oppose a Bulgarian attack on Serbia, indeed they have reasonably hoped for Austria's aid.<sup>24</sup>

The French later expressed unrealistic ideas, that it was Austria who set up for provoking a war, in order to dismember Serbia.<sup>25</sup> Berchtold did not refuse the financial support of Bulgaria, if a war with Serbia becomes reality – he went up to promising 50 million francs<sup>26</sup> – but the suspicion, that the Dual Monarchy was behind the Bulgarian behavior, is not proven yet.

Indeed Tarnowski, Austrian ambassador at Sofia on 23, May, 1913 gave a thorough examination on Austria-Hungary's policy towards Bulgaria. His point of view seems to be a refutation of the above mentioned. Tarnowski stated, that a Bulgaria winning a victory by her own power, was not desirable for Austria-Hungary, as this would give Bulgaria superiority in power at the peninsula and self-esteem, that could force Serbia easily into his alliance. It is better if Bulgaria's dreams can be fulfilled only with the help of Austria-Hungary (or not at all). A Greater Bulgaria as a potential ally of Russia, or a state following her own foreign policy, blocking the way to Saloniki is not desirable, while a Smaller Bulgaria as a potential ally of Austria, with dreams unrealised, which made her hostile towards a Serb-Russian cooperation, is much more useful.<sup>27</sup> As we have stressed it earlier, this interpretation of the usefulness of Bulgaria would be questioned by 1913.

From the end of May 1913, the Bulgarians more or less accepted an armed conflict as a possible outcome of solving the dispute – and they openly threatened the Powers with such steps. Serbs stressed their demands in every newspaper, suggesting their point of view for everyone. Stanchov, Bulgarian ambassador in Paris warned his government not to do so, as these Bulgarian demands would create upheaval in the diplomatic circles.<sup>28</sup>

The viability of Albania also influenced the volume of planned compensation given to Romania. Danev on 16 (29) May, 1913 declared that: *„Up to now Serbia's behavior was in the centre of our interest first, and secondly the fate of Albania, if it is not viable. In the first case, if Serbia violates the agreement and attacks us, Bulgaria will get more favourable borders as a consequence of this, or in the second case, if Bulgaria reaches the Adriatic, in my opinion, we may promise the compensation for Romania (the Tutrakan-Balchik line), but in the first case Romania may acquire only Serbian territories”*.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>24</sup> HHStA Nachlass Baernreithers, Kt. 8. Tagebücher, 1913. 11. 23. Wien

<sup>25</sup> Bourgeois, E.– Pagés, G.: Die Ursachen und Verantwortlichkeiten des Großen Krieges. Hrsg. Schwertfeger, B. Berlin, 1922. p. 356.

<sup>26</sup> „Erkundigt Euch sehr vorsichtig, wieviel Geld Bulgarien brauchen würde, um gegen Serbien kräftig aufzutreten und wenn nötig auch den Krieg zu führen.” In: HHStA. Ad. Reg. F23. Kt. 64. 17/05/1913. Berchtold an Tarnowski and Popper an Fanta.

<sup>27</sup> *Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik*. Eds.: Bittner-Srbik-Pribram-Übersberger, Wien, 1930. Ö-U.A. VI. Nr. 7133. Based on the source the policy of the Dual Monarchy was to push Bulgaria into a war, which, after losing it – which was quite possible, if the promised Austrian aid held off – would be tied to Austria, owing to her demands against her neighbours. This policy had certain dangers in the future explained in the first paragraphs of the article.

See: Löding, D.: Deutschlands und Österreich-Ungarns Balkanpolitik von 1912-14 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung Ihrer Wirtschaftinteresse. Hamburg, 1969. Phil. Diss. p. 83.

<sup>28</sup> So, Bulgarian diplomats confidentially admitted, that their claims were exaggerated. Another problem has arisen, when somebody put the Bulgarian concepts on the future borders into light. As it did produce an upheaval in diplomatic circles as Stanchov foretold, the idea to publish the map could not come from Bulgaria. On this map Greater Bulgaria was extended to the whole Macedonia and Thrace to the Marmora Sea. The rest of the freed territories - including the Sanjak of Novibazar and Epirus - was named Albania. Albanians even reached the Aegean Sea south of Salonika, so the allies did not gain anything. Bulgarian dreams even went further: *„The Montenegrin delegates - as they were not brave enough to complain openly on Serbs - advised to dismember Albania together, so we might get Berat and Valona”* – wrote Danev from the peace negotiations in London. The acquisition of Berat was only possible, if the right side of the Vardar remained Bulgarian! ЦДА, ф 176 к. оп.2. а.е. 1369. л. 147.; Cassavetti, D. J.: Hellas and the Balkan Wars, 1914. pp. 314-316. and ЦДА, ф 176 к. оп.2. а.е. 1369. л. 140. 20/05 (02/06) / 1913.

<sup>29</sup> „Za sega nas ni interesuva povedenieto na Sărbija, a v po-dalechno bădeshte, sădbata na Albanija, ako tja se otkazhe ne zhiznenosposobna. V părvija sluchaj, ako Sărbija potăpche dogovora i ni napadne, i v rezultat, Bălgarija poluchi po-izgodna granica sprjamo neja, kakto i v vtorija sluchaj, ako Bălgarija izleze na Adriaticheskoto more, spored moeto mnenie, mozhe

On 27 May (9 June), 1913 a Turkish delegate confidentially admitted, that Greece wanted to sign a military pact with Turkey against Bulgaria, but the Ottomans refused to do so. „Bulgaria may count on Turkey’s sympathy and friendly neutrality in case of a war between Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece” – pointed out Hilmi pasha.<sup>30</sup> The Bulgarian government believed the content of the telegram, although it was not true. It was especially convincing, that in this letter, Ottoman Turkey promised 50 thousand Albanians to revolt against the Serbs. This telegram was crucial in influencing the forecoming events, since only 3 days earlier, 24 May (6th June) (Hadji)Mishev, the Bulgarian ambassador at Athens warned his government, that Greeks were inquiring the Turks, whether they were planning to attack Edirne (Adrianople) in case of an interallied war. Then, it was the Ottomans who demanded compensation in case of a Serb-Greek-Bulgarian war, and the Greeks were those, who were against to negotiate in that manner.<sup>31</sup>

As there was contradiction between the two telegrams, and the Bulgarians believed in that was favourable for them Madzharov tried to enter into an alliance with the Turks – unsuccessfully. However, from Greece bad news arrived on 9 May from Mishev. When drawing the demarcation line between Greek and Bulgarian troops, the Greek king gave audience for the Bulgarian ambassador. „During the audience His Majesty took a red pen and drew the territories, which Bulgaria may get in the future after the distributon. This line started at Leftera, passed next to Seres, but both settlements remained on Greek hands according to the plan. The king declared, that he would not sign a convention, that gives further territories for the Bulgarians. It was just enough to resign from Kavala and Drama”.<sup>32</sup> So, beside Saloniki, the Greeks now demanded Seres – but Kavala and Drama still could have been spared for the Bulgarians.

General Hesapchiev, the commander of Bulgarian troops in Saloniki also had bad news on 21 May (3 June): the Greek government wanted common borders with Serbia, (beside denouncing from Saloniki and Seres). Hesapchiev drew the attention to the ever increasing Greek claims, which had one goal: forcing Bulgaria to commit a mistake and attack the contested territories. Therefore the arbitration of „friendly Powers” is definitely needed to solve the situation.<sup>33</sup>

The Greeks, since Bulgaria refused the arbitration of either Russia or the Entente, offered a new solution to restore peace.<sup>34</sup> According to this plan two arbiters would be selected – one, Russia, representing the Entente, the other, Germany would represent the Triple Alliance.<sup>35</sup> On 17 May (30 May) Serbia also turned to the Entente, and the joint arbitration of the 6 Powers was also proposed. Venizelos tried to gain advantage from the fact, that his government was characterised by pro-entente sentiment, while King Constantine was the favourite of Kaiser Wilhelm. Mishev saw it right, that Greece was hesitating between the two alliance systems as Bulgaria did, but while both alliance systems wanted to win Greece for his cause by offers, Bulgaria was not favoured by any of them. The Bulgarian government also knew, that Germans would not support Bulgarian claims, but hoped, that Russia – which,

*da se obeshtae na Rumänija kompensacija, kato se gleda, shtoto v pärvija sluchaj da obhvashta samo sārbska teritorija...*  
In: ЦДА, ф 176 к. оп.2. а.е. 1369. л. 53.

<sup>30</sup> ЦДА, ф 176 к. оп.2. а.е. 1369. л. 275. 27 May / 9 June / 1913.

<sup>31</sup> ЦДА, ф 176 к. оп.2. а.е. 1369. л. 223. 24 May / 6. June / 1913.

<sup>32</sup> ЦДА, ф 176 к. оп.2. а.е. 1369. л. 84.

<sup>33</sup> ЦДА, ф 176 к. оп.2. а.е. 1369. л. 150.

<sup>34</sup> Lorey, A.: Frankreichs Politik während der Balkankriege 1912-1913. Diss. Frankfurt. M. Dresden. 1941. p. 108. The Russian proposal, that the Powers of the Entente should decide in the question of Greek-Bulgarian border, was refused by Pichon, as he feared, that both parties would be unsatisfied with the result, and turn away from the Entente, while the Triple Alliance would not accept a decision made without the presence of their representatives. Therefore Pichon thought, that parties should turn to all Powers or to the Triple Alliance. Sazonov refused this version, as he wanted to exclude Austria-Hungary from the decision. See: Documents diplomatiques français, (DDF). 1929- , 3. VI. Nr. 611., Nr. 631.

<sup>35</sup> ЦДА, ф 176 к. оп.2. а.е. 1369. л. 272. 27 May (9 June) / 1913.

according to Mishev may give the right side of the Vardar to the Serbs in a Serb-Bulgarian debate – will support Bulgaria in the Greek-Bulgarian dispute (if Russia wants to counterbalance Germany and not to raise the bid over the German offer to Greece. In the latter case Bulgaria will suffer a diplomatic defeat at this scene too). The strategic importance of the Greek seashore is too great, while Bulgaria's presence on the Aegean is not desired, as it would be too close to the Straits. Therefore Mishev proposed to refuse the German-Russian joint arbitration because of the unpredictable result.

Instead of this, the Bulgarian ambassador proposed the joint arbitration of all Powers, but they refused doing this (remembering the futile efforts of the St. Peterburg protocol and of the conferences at London) – with the exception of Germany, represented by Zimmermann. Thus Bulgaria lost another opportunity to isolate Serbs from Greeks.

On the next day Kalinkov sent a telegram from Bucharest in which he informed his government, if war broke out, Romania would mobilize his troops, and would not stay neutral.<sup>36</sup> Later, on 26 June, Russia also advised to do this. Shebeko, the Russian ambassador at Bucharest (just like the French) urged mobilization for Romania in order to prevent a Serb-Bulgarian conflict, maintaining the Balkan League intact. Beyond these, he advised the immediate occupation of the Tutrakan-Balchik line, also to prevent fights.<sup>37</sup> Contrary to Russian hopes in this case the Serb-Bulgarian conflict would sharpen further, since the Serbs wouldn't give territorial concession to the Bulgarians, if Romania did not support Bulgaria (and Romania would not be obliged to support Bulgaria, if they accepted the Russian solution). A Romanian occupation of the territories prior to a Serb-Bulgarian war may provoke a Romanian-Bulgarian war, which would have been exploited easily by the Serbs and Greeks. But Romania was not urged to step forth, as Maiorescu realised his advantageous position. It is possible that Shebeko thought, that after satisfying Romanian demands, Serbia could not rely on Romania's help in a war against Bulgaria. But his advice was favourable for the Serbian and Romanian cause indeed. Shebeko might have thought too, that if Romania gained Southern Dobruja with the support of Russia, it could drift more easily to the Russian sphere of interest, and the Balkan League may survive exchanging Bulgaria to Romania in the alliance system. (Russia considered Bulgaria as the ally of Austria-Hungary by that time).<sup>38</sup> Furthermore, Romania can be diverted against Austria-Hungary by promising Transylvania. And if the Dual Monarchy collapses, the Serbs may get whole Albania, and in that case, Macedonia could be given back to Bulgaria, thus – on a long run – Bulgaria may return to the League.<sup>39</sup>

This plan, mentioned by Sosnosky as the creation of the Russian diplomacy, reflects the fears of Austria-Hungary on the one hand, and shows similarity to the plan of Milovanović and Geshov from 1911 on the other, meaning that the latter was not an isolated phenomenon, and influenced Power policy as well.

The behavior of Romania was worrying for Bulgaria, therefore it is interesting to examine, how diplomats reacted to the growing tensions. On 16 (28) May Teodorov, Bulgarian Minister of Finance sent a message from Paris: „*I think we should not buy Romania's friendship by offering new territories. I repeat, that after a victorious (!) war against Serbs and Greeks our situation would be more crucial, due to the demands of Turkey*

<sup>36</sup> ЦЛИА, ф 176 к. оп.2. а.е. 1369. л. 285. 28 May / 10 June / 1913.

<sup>37</sup> Sosnosky, *Th. von*, p. 357. and Lorey, A., p. 112. The Romanians informed Danev on their point of view on 27 June. DDF. 3. VII. Nr. 68., Nr. 73., Nr. 170., and Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette. (G.P.) Eds.: Thimme, F.-Lepsius, I. - Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, A., Berlin, 1927. XXXV. Nr. 13435., and Ö-U.A. VI. Nr. 7530. St. Peterburg decided not to tolerate the occupation of the Sanjak of Novipazar as a counterstep. DDF. VII. Nr. 135., Nr. 86., BD. IX-2. 1111.

<sup>38</sup> According to Lorey, A. p. 113. like St. Peterburg, Paris did not want to weaken Bulgaria too much, in order to avoid the revanche-policy of Bulgaria drifting to the side of Austria-Hungary.

<sup>39</sup> Sosnosky, *Th. von*, p. 357.

*and Romania ... just let them find support at our enemies...”*<sup>40</sup> *Sooner or later we have to make a deal with the Greeks giving a peaceful outcome to our debate, rather than accepting the arbitration of Powers or - in last case -, Russia. This won't be such bad as initiating a war... We have to do everything to avoid a conflict – lasting for days – with two states at the same time, since after winning a victory over two opponents, we have to count on that a third or a fourth will attack us among our neighbours. The Russians told today, that they encouraged the Serbs for peace.”*<sup>41</sup>

Teodorov – though overestimated the value of the Bulgarian army – saw the Greek question quite well. But we have already seen, that the Greek offer next day – which was interpreted by Mishev – was refused by the Bulgarian government.

The opinion of Teodorov on the Romanian question is worth comparing with Salabashev's telegram, dated from 17 May, which focuses on the opinion of Tschirschky, German ambassador at Vienna. The Germans urged an agreement with Romania. *„If Bulgaria magnanimously gives something to Romania ... then Romania will help Bulgaria in a war for Macedonia against Greeks and Serbs.”*<sup>42</sup> The explicit opinion of Tschirschky was, that Romania would help Bulgaria with her armed forces. This telegram, suggesting a solution completely the opposite of Teodorov's idea, made the Bulgarians think over the alliance with Romania once more. Unfortunately, Tschirschky's opinion was not the official policy adopted by Germany, indeed, it is still dubious, whether Tschirschky gave fake information intentionally (as Romania was worth more in German policy than Bulgaria). Bulgaria really calculated with Tschirschky's idea, but a diplomatic mistake of Austria-Hungary (mentioned here later) seemed to verify Teodorov's point of view.

On the beginning of June, the Bulgarian government still found the doors opened for any of the above mentioned solutions: an agreement with Romania or Turkey, accepting the arbitration, or making a deal with Greece or Serbia. However, the ideas of Teodorov contained elements of Realpolitik – like the necessity of avoiding a war, the increasing demands of the former allies – his solution of making a bargain with Greece was undermined by his unrealistic trust in Bulgarian weapons, and that the new Serb-Greek agreement forbade separate agreements.

The strategy of Teodorov was one of the most viable ideas mentioned up to now (of course in order to settle the Macedonian question with the Serbs) to fix the problem. If it succeeds, Bulgaria regains its independence from Power policy and ability to manoeuvre, since it is not the pressure from the Powers that forces her to make up with Greece, but her own will. In that case Bulgaria does not need to turn to the Triple Alliance.

The preliminary peace treaty signed on 30 May created a new situation. Madzharov drew attention on the changing political situation, representing the aggressive wing of the Bulgarian foreign policy, which became predominant (and official policy) later. *”In my opinion the only way to prevent war (with Serbia) is to move our troops towards Sofia as soon as possible, then we offer a deadline to the Serbs to retreat from the uncontested zone, of course, only in case they refuse Russian arbitration. We mustn't enter to any kind of negotiation beyond those principles laid down in the convention. It is time to raise our voice, and let the world know, especially the Russians, that we are not afraid of a war with Serbia. Any proposal on a conference between the allies is a trap. I guess the Greeks got frightened, that's why they intend to come to an understanding with us... From now on we have to make an agreement with Montenegro against Serbia. The behaviour of Serbs is so dishonest, that it*

<sup>40</sup> ЦДА, ф 176 к. оп.2. а.е. 1369. л. 54.

<sup>41</sup> ЦДА, ф 176 к. оп.2. а.е. 1369. л. 55.

<sup>42</sup> ЦДА, ф 176 к. оп.2. а.е. 1369. л. 107. 17/30. May / 1913.

*relieves us from any kind of obligation.*<sup>43</sup> It is important to emphasize, that Madzharov did not reject an agreement with Greece.

Another – different from the above written – telegram arrived from I. Sz. Geshov, Bulgarian ambassador at Berlin. The relative of the former Prime Minister wrote, that the Romanians are happy, that they have opportunity to grab more territories beyond Silistra, given to Romania by the protocol of St. Petersburg, as „*more or less everybody is dissatisfied with the result of the Protocol of St. Petersburg. If there won't be armed conflict with Serbia, the Romanian discontent may remain within the frame of inner policy, without any international importance. But if war breaks out, Romania will demand compensation, therefore our interest is to settle a preliminary agreement with Romania and promise something ... Serbia has already made her offer twice to Romania.*”<sup>44</sup> According to the ambassador, Bulgaria has to make up with Turkey. Germans – although they sympathize with Bulgaria – will not interfere into the events, while Greece is backed by the Entente. The German interests – an alliance with Turkey, agreement with Romania and Greece, potentially forming a new Balkan League – also appear here between the lines.

Although both parties were lacking trust towards each other, Austria-Hungary's dreams about a Romanian-Bulgarian agreement were thwarted by an unexpected Serb diplomatic movement. On 26 May (8 June), A. Toshev, Bulgarian ambassador at Serbia warned the Bulgarian government, that a Power was planning compensation for Serbia in Macedonia, if she refrains from reaching the Adriatic. Toshev suspected, that the offer was made by the Russian Nikolai Gartwig, but he refused the accusation. In a letter sent to Geshov (then Prime Minister of Bulgaria) on 15 May (28 May), it become evident, that Austria-Hungary offered the Vardar-valley to the Serbs, if they leave Albania willingly.<sup>45</sup>

Pašić, Serbian Prime Minister thought, they had obeyed, therefore Serbia has right to get compensation and to revise the agreement of 1912. This step of Austria-Hungary created distrust in Bulgaria towards Austria-Hungary, and thus a contract with Romania has also become suspicious. The game was won by Serbia, as implicately – through her offer – the Dual Monarchy has recognised the revision of the treaty of 1912. The objection of Berchtold, that the offer is not valid, as the Serbs left Albania under the pressure of Powers and not willingly, was futile, the Bulgarian-Austrian relations were deteriorating.

An alliance with Romania was therefore an undesired solution for Bulgaria. A similar shock was struck on the Bulgarian diplomacy, when on 18 May (31 May), a day after signing the preliminary peace in London, Sazonov proposed to give Struga, Kratovo, Veles and Krushevo to the Serbs, towns located at the southern part of the contested zone, or even beyond that, in the uncontested zone. This meant, that in case of a Russian arbitration Bulgaria not only loses the full contested zone, but territories beyond this.<sup>46</sup> This increased Bulgarian distrust toward a Russian arbitration.

Mishev's account on the same thing was even less calming. Mishev wrote, that Venizelos wanted to meet Geshov, in order to settle the territorial questions. If it is impossible, he offered that all the four allies<sup>47</sup> should travel to St. Petersburg. Mishev's personal opinion was, that such an arbitration may cause serious harm to the Bulgarian cause. „*Today the Russian ambassador openly agreed with demands of Pašić, stating that he will*

<sup>43</sup> ЦДА, ф 176 к. оп.2. а.е. 1369. л. 115. 18/31. May 1913.

<sup>44</sup> ЦДА, ф 176 к. оп.2. а.е. 1369. л. 130. 19 May / 1 June 1913. and ЦДА, ф 176 к. оп.2. а.е. 1369. л. 140.

<sup>45</sup> ЦДА, ф 176 к. оп.2. а.е. 1369. л. 262. See further: *Vojnata mezhdu Bălgarija i drugite Balkanski dărzhavi prez 1913g.* (II/1). Prichinite i podgotovka na vojната i voennite dejstvija do 21-i Juni. Sofia, 1941. Ministerstvo na Vojната, Shtab na armijata. p. 25. and ЦДА, ф 176 к. оп.2. а.е. 1369. л. 82-83.

<sup>46</sup> ЦДА, ф 176 к. оп.2. а.е. 1369. л. 103.

<sup>47</sup> The Serb-Bulgarian agreement about the Russian arbitration was valid originally for these two states, therefore the interference of the further two was annoying the Bulgarians, since they knew, in case of voting these would support Serbia's demands, while the Russians hoped to maintain the unity of the League in this way.

always find an opportunity to promote the cause of the common Serb-Greek border, which we explained as we should renounce from Lake Ohrid, and territories east of the lake.<sup>48</sup> Szazonov admitted, that morally the Serbs had the right for the revision of the treaty of March 1912. This was another proof for Bulgaria, that the Russians won't keep the principles of the agreement of 1912 at the arbitration, therefore they lost their belief in that solution too. So nothing more remained, beside a separate agreement with the former allies.

Bulgaria emphasized, that her policy is based on confidence of the the given word laid down in the treaties, but indeed trusted nobody: „If Bulgaria had not been so resolute to be faithful to her allies, and if her deeds had been driven by egoism and opportunism, Bulgaria would have found several ways to defend her interests. And she wouldn't have remained isolated surrounded by the block of her neighbours.”<sup>49</sup> Although the frankness of the sentence (as of the Bulgarian policy) may be questioned, by the end of May, 1913 Bulgarians realized, that they have isolated themselves by their maximalist policy.

The Bulgarians refused the first two solutions - i.e. an alliance and a deal with one of the neighbours, or arbitration, while they were unable to secure the support of the Powers, as the latter (support from Powers) would suppose the realisation any of the first two solutions. Since the influence of the Powers was present only indirectly during this period, by supporting the aspirations of their satellite-states, the direct interference of the Powers would lead to a counterstep from another, escalating the conflict. This situation was neglected by the Bulgarian government, which committed a serious mistake. The direct involvement of Powers in events was now missing, unlike in the case of Skutari or Durres, as the distribution of the occupied territories was not a primordial interest of any of the Powers, unlike maintaining peace, (if possible) between the two alliance systems.

The decision-making in the Bulgarian government was delayed by the lack of selection of the arriving information and by the constraints on verifying the relevance of reports. Salabashev on 24 May (6 June) reported another interesting opinion from Tschirschky. According to the German ambassador in Vienna „Austria-Hungary will support immediately, to the bitter end Bulgaria's interests against Serbia and Greece. Italy has already arranged everything with Austria. Germany agrees with Austria-Hungary, and accepts that she is entitled to lead the Triple Alliance politically in any question arising on the Balkan Peninsula.”<sup>50</sup>

It remains unknown, how this telegram influenced the Bulgaria's policy , since almost nothing was true, what Tschirschky had said (especially compared to Tarnowski's plan). Was it an intentional dezinformation? A friendly step to calm down the war party in Austria? A betrayal of Austrian interests (see below)? An attempt to influence the official German Balkan-policy? Or Salabashev simply misunderstood something or he gave fake information to influence Bulgarian policy? Salabashev continued: „Beyond these, Germany is of the opinion, that a strong Bulgaria is needed to step up against Serbia. Germany should attempt to isolate Greece from the Entente, and to elaborate a Turkish-Romanian-Bulgarian-Greek alliance against Serbia. From this purpose, Bulgaria has to make up with Greece and renounce from Saloniki, but any other settlement should fall into Bulgaria's hands. Thus Bulgaria's war against Serbia will be easier.”<sup>51</sup>

The text contained partial truths. It is true, that Germans wanted to create a new Balkan League – with Turkey, but without Bulgaria. So German plans were contrary to Berchtold's idea. Tschirschky states, that Berchtold's idea was well-accepted in Berlin, which is not true.

<sup>48</sup> „... Dnes ruskija pälnomoshten ministär otrkrito se izrazi udobritelno za deklaraciite na Pasicha, i kaza, che vse shte nameri väzmozhnost... da se udovletvori gräcko-särbskoto silno zhelanie za obshtii granici, koeto oznachava da se otkazhem ot Ohridskoto ezero i goljama chast ot teritorija na iztok ot tova ezero.” In: ЦДА, ф 176 к. оп.2. а.е. 1369. л. 127.

<sup>49</sup> ЦДА, ф 176 к. оп.2. а.е. 1369. л. 105.

<sup>50</sup> ЦДА, ф 176 к. оп.2. а.е. 1369. л. 220.

<sup>51</sup> Uo.

The German ambassador openly encouraged Bulgaria against Serbia to wage war, which was against the official German policy. It is well-known, that later at the Bucharest peace conference, Germany did not support Bulgaria, even Kavala was given to Greece.

It was true, that an agreement between Greece and Bulgaria was not only a German interest, but Bulgarian as well. The German ambassador refused Berchtold's Bulgarian-Romanian agreement, as it was against German interests. Although Tschirschky was convinced, that Bulgaria and Turkey has to shake hands: Germany needed strong states to promote her economic penetration, covering the main railway lines to Baghdad - a Turkish-Bulgarian alliance was not welcomed by the official German foreign policy.

Beside this, the Bulgarians had only one chance. Salabashev also wrote, that Hussein Hilmi Pasha warned Austria-Hungary, that Turkey would attack Greece, if Aegean islands were given to Greeks by the Powers at the London conference of ambassadors.<sup>52</sup> But Powers were working slow, no decision was made before the end of the second Balkan War.

By the end of May, Kalinkov warned his government, that Bulgaria either had to come to terms with Romania, or had to negotiate with all of her neighbours on widened base – the latter seemed to be more difficult. According to him, by involving Romania in the affairs, the split balance of the Balkan League can be restored, and the alliance won't collapse, and if it collapses, Bulgaria can rely on Romania's support in case of external threat.<sup>53</sup>

The Bulgarians were informed, that the mobilisation of Serbian troops was proposed by Russia and France. The opportunity of an agreement in which Bulgarians could count on Romania's active support has lost by that time. Having supporters among the Powers, the Romanians now can step into action more energetically to satisfy their claims. At the outbreak of the war, on 29 June, Danev wrote, that „*everything shows, that Romania does not want to reach an agreement with us, hoping, that in case of war, she may increase her demands, since she neither wishes a strong Bulgaria, nor maintaining peace.*”<sup>54</sup> This was true, but earlier Bulgaria had chances to reach an agreement with Romania, but refused to do so. Romania's interest now was to wait, who „pays more”. In the present situation the Bulgarians needed Romania's help, and not contrary. Romania had nothing to lose in a war on the same side with Greece and Serbia

Contrary to these, Bulgaria was thrown with a chance once more. On 22 June (5 July) Romania informed Danev, that in the following 10 days their troops would not cross the border, therefore Bulgaria has 2 chances to avoid the consequences of the events: either stops military actions and accepts the arbitration of the Russian Tsar (on a widened base!) or gives Romania a compensation (Tutrakan-Balchik line). But the latter case *now* did not mean a Romanian intervention on Bulgaria's side, just neutrality. Bulgaria decided to choose a third solution: he wanted to defeat Greece and Serbia within ten days, before Romania attacks.<sup>55</sup>

According to the information of Kalindero, Romanian ambassador in Sofia, Romania would have been satisfied by the Tutrakan-Balchik line even on 8 July, and in that case it would have stopped mobilisation (however this would not help Bulgaria, since they had lost the battle of Bregalnica by 8 July). Due to the rumours on Bulgarian defeat, the second part of the telegram was full of assaults, that Romania will dictate peace from Sofia, with different terms – demanding the Ruse-Shumen-Varna line.

The Bulgarian response was harsh and futile: „*Bulgaria is not afraid of any threat from Romania, she should understand, that until the fortune of Macedonia is endangered, Bulgaria*

<sup>52</sup> ЦДА, ф 176 к. оп.2. а.е. 1369. л. 260. 25 May (7 June) / 1913.

<sup>53</sup> Kalinkov, G.: Rumänija i nejnata politika sprjamo Bălgarija (1911-1913). Sofia, 1917. pp. 206-207. Teodorov, Minister of Finance refused Romanian claims, as he thought, that Romania would not help actively Bulgaria even in case of a compensation now, and he wanted to negotiate with Greece. The hesitation and mesmerisation of the Bulgarian diplomacy is clearly seen from the fact that Kalinkov did not get response for 10 days, later Danev informed him, that he resigned.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 216-217. Danev to Kalinkov.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.* p. 221. Kalinkov's telegram to Danev

*is ready to sacrifice anything*<sup>56</sup> - anything, but not sacrificing Southern Dobruja. Although earlier Sz. Bobchev from St. Petersburg warned Bulgaria, that in case of a Romanian attack, Russia would be neutral, and refused the agreement of 1902 on military aid, Danev only after the defeat (on 9 July) agreed to initiate negotiations with Romania. It meant, that Bulgaria had nothing to hope, and its goal was now to minimize territorial losses, while Romania might increase her demands. Since Bulgaria had no other possibility to avert this, therefore she turned to Russia to save Bulgaria from complete humiliation (as Austria-Hungary did nothing) – well, an earlier step would have been welcomed by Russians and Bulgars of Macedonia as well...

The conditions were the following: (1) Bulgaria immediately renounces from the Tutrakan-Balchik line - here the Russians can play the benefactors of Romania (and the savior of Bulgaria), overshadowing Austria-Hungary. (2) Bulgaria immediately suspends military operations (saving Greece from a defeat under Simitli), (3) Romania plays a decisive role in solving the obstacles on the Balkans (here Russia and Bulgaria gave chance to Romania to play a leading role in the peace – rather than let Austria-Hungary interfere into the debate defending both Romania's and Bulgaria's interests).

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These all evidenced, that the Bulgarian government was aware of the dangers threatening its aims, and had ideas about the possible outcomes, risks and consequences. The two point of views „**Za Makedonija shte dadem raceto na djabola**” i „**Politikata na vsichko ili nishto e politikata na avantjuristite**” clashed during these months, but the political elite was unable tie itself consequently to one solution. Overestimating her military success, Bulgaria thought, that based on arms she could force the realisation of the agreement of 1912 in favour of her demands, although several Bulgarian diplomats warned the leaders, that even a military victory over two enemies could not solve the crisis.

Bulgaria probably thought that a military conflict among the former allies might endanger the maintenance of the balance of power between the two alliance systems, and might result a European war, therefore the Powers would never let it happen (the escalation and prolongation of hostilities between the former allies). But Bulgaria forgot about the fact, that this fragile equilibrium of Power policy could only be guaranteed by the non-intervention of the Powers.

Bulgarian policy was oscillating, searching for both Russia's and Austria's friendship without undertaking any obligations.<sup>57</sup> This inconsequent policy of adventurers (everything or nothing) was a complete failure. Bulgaria was unable to sign alliance either with Romania or Turkey, lost the opportunity to accord with her former allies without the arbitration of one or more Powers, refused a bargain with the Greeks to weaken Serbia, and alienated herself from the Powers. The mesmerised Bulgarian diplomacy trusted nobody, but a paper (the accord of 1912), that was questioned (or at least its interpretation) not only by her ally, but by the arbiter as well. The political elite was fully responsible for the resulting political isolation of the country.

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<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 223-224. Kalinkov to Ferdinand

<sup>57</sup> *Tukin, C.*: Die politische Beziehungen zwischen Österreich-Ungarn und Bulgarien von 1908 bis zum Bukarester Frieden. Hamburg, 1936. p. 176.